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This paper uses a “natural experiment” in Canadian divorce law reform to
discriminate empirically between unitary and Nash-bargained models of the household. 
Using time-series data from three Canadian provinces, it demonstrates that following
landmark divorce law reforms in the 1970s—reforms that led to improvements in women's
expected settlement upon divorce in Ontario and British Columbia, suicide rates for older,
married women in these provinces registered a sharp decline. Similar declines were not
registered for younger, unmarried women or men in Ontario and British Columbia, nor for
older, married women in Quebec, where the legal basis for divorce did not change.  These
results are consistent with Nash-bargained models of the household but not with the 
unitary model.CONTENTS
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generate a single household welfare function, are discussed in Bergstrom (1997) and Alderman et al. (1995).
1.  INTRODUCTION
If the joint family utility framework is to be replaced by a less
parsimonious model of intra-family allocation, the increase in
complexity should be explicitly demonstrated to have empirically
distinguishable predictions (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1984).
Economists analyzing household decisionmaking allocation have traditionally
assumed that the household acts as a single unit.  It is assumed that there exists a single
decisionmaker whose preferences form the basis of a household welfare function and that
all household resources are effectively pooled.   This is termed the “unitary model”
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(Alderman et al. 1995), the “common preference model” (Lundberg and Pollak 1996), or
the “joint family utility model” (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1984).  
More recently, the assumptions behind this approach have been questioned.  An
alternative, the “collective model,” takes as its starting point the possibility that different
household members have different preference orderings and that the resolution of these
differences is a nontrivial problem.  One approach taken by Pierre-Andre Chiappori and
his collaborators starts with individual utility functions and assumes only that the
reconciliation of differing preferences is Pareto efficient (Browning et al. 1994).  A second2
approach is taken by Marjorie McElroy (1990, 1997), building on earlier collaborative
work with Mary-Jean Horney (McElroy and Horney 1981) as well as a related paper by
Marilyn Manser and Murray Brown (1980).  Here, individuals use a cooperative Nash-
bargaining solution as the mechanism by which differences in preference rankings are
resolved.  A somewhat different approach is taken by David Ulph (1988), Lundberg and
Pollak (1994), and Michael Carter and Elizabeth Katz (1997), who use noncooperative
game theory.  Instead of resolving differences through preferences, individual household
members maximize their own utility functions, taking as given the maximizing actions of
other household members.  Finally, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) have suggested a
“separate spheres model” in which household members base their joint decisions on a
cooperative bargaining solution, with a noncooperative outcome being the fallback
position of each party. 
Despite the plethora of theoretical models that have been developed in the last 15
years, reviews by Jere Behrman (1996); Hoddinott, Alderman, and Haddad (1997);
Lundberg and Pollak (1996); John Strauss and Duncan Thomas (1995); and John Strauss
and Kathleen Beegle (1995) emphasize that attempts to differentiate unitary from
collective models suffer from several failings.  One is the problem of “observational
equivalence.”  Certain collective models yield predictions identical to those derived from a
unitary model.  A second is that regressors that are claimed to reflect bargaining power,
such as an individual’s income, can plausibly be regarded as endogenous, rendering their
estimated parameters biased.  Finally, even if a “bargaining variable” is truly exogenous, it3
 This discussion draws heavily on McLeod and Mamo (1993, amended 1995).
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may be correlated with some unobserved characteristic of the individual, again producing
biased parameter estimates.  Alderman et al. (1995) and Lundberg and Pollak (1996)
argue that on the whole, the evidence supports a shifting of the burden of proof onto those
who would maintain the unitary model as a basis of understanding intrahousehold
allocations.  Others, such as Behrman and Strauss, argue that these econometric
deficiencies mean that studies claiming to differentiate unitary from collective models are
fatally flawed.
This paper provides a somewhat stark empirical test that discriminates between
unitary and one variant of collective models, the Nash bargaining model.  At the core of
this model is the argument that a change in women’s fallback position outside of the
household improves their position within the household.  The empirical challenge is to find
such a change that is not subject to the critiques noted above.
We argue that changes in provincial divorce law in Canada provide precisely such
an example.  Matrimonial property law in Canada comes under provincial jurisdiction. 
Under common law  “the husband and wife became one person” by marriage, and
common law added the rider that “the husband became that person.”   The husband
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acquired control over all property owned by his wife at the time of marriage or acquired
by her during marriage, except for minor, personal items such as jewelry and clothing.  In
the late 19th century, the enactment of the “Married Woman's Property Act” in the United
Kingdom, and its subsequent replication in all Canadian provinces except Quebec, gave4
women the right to hold property in their own name, including property acquired both
before and during marriage.  However, the acquisition and ownership of property was tied
to direct financial contribution.  If a husband was the household breadwinner while his
spouse remained at home, the wife had no legal claim to assets acquired in her husband’s
name.
A case before the Supreme Court of Canada in 1973, Murdoch v. Murdoch, was the
catalyst for change in this aspect of family law.  The case involved a contested divorce
between a Mr. and Mrs. Murdoch.  For the first four years of their marriage, the
Murdochs worked on ranches as a hired couple, with their pay being given to Mr.
Murdoch.  These funds were used, in part, to purchase a ranch and homestead.  Over the
next 20 years, Mrs. Murdoch made a substantial contribution to the operation and
management of the ranch.  When the marriage broke down, she sought a judicial
separation and claimed she was entitled to a one-half share, not only in the homestead, but
also in the ranch.  However, in the absence of a direct, financial contribution or an
extraordinary financial contribution, the court held that Mrs. Murdoch's actions were “just
about what the ordinary rancher’s wife does.”  As there was no explicit agreement linking
Mrs. Murdoch’s labor efforts to an entitlement to a share of the ranch, she was deemed to
have no interest in the ranch.  She thus lost her case and faced financial destitution.
Almost immediately, remedial legislative action was put into place.  The
Government of Ontario passed the Family Law Reform Act, 1975.  It provided that “no
spouse should be dis-entitled to an interest in property simply because his or her efforts5
were no more than might be expected from a reasonable spouse of the kind” (McLeod and
Mamo 1995, O–4).  Nonmonetary contributions to the household, such as child care, gave
the contributory spouse an interest in assets acquired during marriage.  It is important to
note that the law applied to all marriages in existence at that time.  The act was
subsequently amended by the Family Law Act, 1978, which went on to “provide that upon
marriage breakdown each spouse was entitled to an equal interest in the ‘family assets’
regardless of who owned the assets.”
Other provinces followed suit, with the exception of Quebec.  As a French colony
until 1763, Quebec was subject to civil law as embodied in the Custom of Paris.  This
body of laws was retained when Quebec became a British colony and was eventually
codified in 1866 and protected in the bill that provided Canada with its independence from
Britain in 1867.  “The Custom of Paris treated matrimonial property as community
property but permitted the parties to enter into a marriage contract and, thereby, choose to
be in separation of property” (McLeod and Mamo 1995, Q-1).  Although this law has
been subject to some change over time, the basic nature of this arrangement—the fact that
both parties have entitlement to property acquired over the course of the marriage—has
remained unchanged.
We test the Nash cooperative bargaining model by examining the impact of the
legislative change on the suicide rates of adult women.  Although suicide rates might at
first appear a rather extreme indicator of well-being, we believe it is well suited for the
purposes of our study.  Not only is the decision to take one’s own life the ultimateU
m
o (x m,l m) and U
f
o (x f,l f),
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  Moreover, an explicit link between suicide and unhappy marriages is not an unusual concept,
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forming as it does the basis of novels such as Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina and Fassbinder’s film, Effi Briest.
indicator of an absence of well-being, we can draw on the formal economic analysis of
suicide presented by Daniel Hamermesh and Hugo Soss (1974), and the recent extensions
proposed by Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck (1994), to derive testable implications for
the theory of household models.
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The paper begins with a short theoretical discussion that provides a direct link
between suicide and a change in the bargaining position of women within the household. 
After briefly outlining our data sources and our modeling strategy, we consider the impact
of this legislative change on suicide rates of adult women and men in Ontario.  We then
extend our analysis to Quebec and British Columbia.
2.  THEORY
In this section, we synthesize McElroy and Horney’s (1981) and McElroy’s (1990,
1997) cooperative Nash-bargained model of household behavior with Hamermesh and
Soss’s (1974) economic theory of suicide.  Doing so satisfies the criterion laid out by
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1984) at the beginning of this paper:  that our alternative to the
unitary model has an empirically distinguishable prediction.
We assume that a household consists of two individuals, m and f.  If they are
unmarried, their utility functions are given by   where U is the
utility, the x’s are consumption goods consumed by m and f, respectively, and the l’s referp
i @ x
i % w
i @ l
i ’ I
i % w
i @ T for i ’ m,f .
N /[U m(x) & V
m
o (p m,w m,I m;"m )] @ [U f(x) & V
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V
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o
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to the consumption of leisure time.  These utility functions are maximized subject to
individual full-income constraints.  Denoting p’s as prices, w’s as wages, T as time
endowment, and I’s as nonlabor incomes, these constraints can be written as
This constrained maximization generates indirect utility functions,   Note
that these include the parameters "  and ".  McElroy (1990, 563) terms these “extra-
m    f
household environmental parameters” or EEPs.  These are variables that shift the
maximum value of utility attainable outside of marriage.  “EEPs include wealth or
permanent income and productivity outside of marriage . . . They would also include
parameterizations of variations in the rules for property settlements and of the rules
governing marriage and divorce” (McElroy 1997, 58).
If m and f marry,   serve as threat points.  m and f are assumed to have
utility functions defined over their own and their spouse’s consumption of goods and
leisure, x = (x , x , l , l ).  This gives U (x) and U(x).  The Nash-bargained solution
m    f     m     f         m     f
requires that m and f choose x so as to maximize the product of the gains from marriage,
that is,
Maximizing the gains from marriage subject to the sum of the individual full-income
constraints yields demand functions for goods and leisure of the following form:Zi(a,Q) ’ I
T
a e &r(n&a) U
i
n P(n)d(n) ,
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x = x (p , p , w , w , I , I ; " , " ) i = m, f
i    i  m    f   m    f    m    f   m    f 
l = l (p , p , w , w , I , I ; " , " ) i = m, f .
i    i  m    f   m    f    m    f   m    f 
Note that (Mx / M" ) $ 0 and (Ml / M" ) $ 0 for i = m, f.  An improvement in the
i    i          i    i
extra-household environmental parameter for person i generates an increase in his or her
level of consumption and thus in his or her well-being.  It is important to note, as McElroy
demonstrates, that these EEPs do not appear in the standard, unitary model of the
household.
The next step borrows heavily from Hamermesh and Soss’s (1974) economic theory
of suicide.  We begin by denoting a vector, Q, whose elements consist of x and l .  For an
i           i     i
individual aged n, the present value of their lifetime utility at age a can be written as
where r is the private discount rate, T is the highest attainable age, Ui is i’s utility function
as defined above, and P(n) is the probability of surviving to age n given that that person
has survived to age a.  Z is an increasing function of Q, that is, MZ/MQ > 0.  Following
Hamermesh and Soss, we define b - N(0, F ) as i's distaste for suicide.  A person commits
i      2
suicide if
Z (a, Q) + b = 0. i
i9
The fraction of individuals within a given cohort who commit suicide at age a is
S(a) = f [ - Z(a, Q)],
where f(@) is the density function for b.  As Hamermesh and Soss note (1974, 85), the
i
suicide rate is the proportion of individuals within a cohort for whom Z(a, Q) equals b at
age a.  Totally differentiating this yields
dS = - fN ( (MZ / Ma) @ da + (MZ/MQ) @ dQ) .
Since MZ/MQ > 0 and  MQ / M" > 0, an improvement in the EEP leads to an increase in Z. 
i
Three empirical implications follow from this.  First, the change in divorce
settlement law is clearly an example of a change in an EEP.  We expect that it should
reduce suicides only among married women:  there should be no effect on suicides of
unmarried women.  Second, the legislative change described in the introduction should
have a larger effect on the suicide rates of married, older women.  For life-cycle reasons,
these women are more likely to be in households that have accumulated significant levels
of wealth.  By contrast, we would expect the legislative change to have had a lesser effect
on newly married women whose households had not yet begun to accumulate.  Also, if
older women find it more difficult to re-enter the labor force, access to household assets
on divorce would be an especially important source of income.  Third, the impact of this10
legislative change is asymmetric.  In this model, suicide occurs when the present value of
lifetime utility falls to zero.  Ensuring that women have the ability to avoid destitution after
divorce can be seen as lifting their post-divorce lifetime utilities above zero.  Although the
legislative change reduces men’s utilities, these do not fall to zero.  Men’s utilities would
fall to zero only if, following divorce, women were given all assets and men were left
destitute.
3.  DATA AND METHODS
The basic hypothesis we wish to test is that the change in Ontarian law should have
led to a structural break in the trend suicide rate among married women in Ontario after
1975.  Before turning to our results, we discuss several aspects of the data and our
methods.
Our data on suicides are annual rates for the period 1960–1994.  Although the legal
reforms were enacted in all Anglophone provinces between 1975 and 1979, we focus our
attention on the impact of this legal change in Ontario.  There are two reasons for this. 
First, the accuracy of suicide data is often contested.  Some authors claim that up to a
third of Canadian coroners are reluctant to certify a death as suicide (Syer-Solursh and
Wyndowe 1981).  In Ontario, all coroners must be medically trained and all must attend
provincial programs on death certification.  As a result, there is greater consistency in the
reporting of suicides in Ontario than in other provinces (Health and Welfare Canada
1989).  Further, because suicide is a comparatively rare event, measured in cases per11
 Our data are drawn from the Vital Statistics series 804-202, -204, -205, and -206 published each year
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by Statistics Canada and, prior to 1971, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.
100,000 individuals, even small variations in reporting from year to year will have a
marked effect on the reported rate in much less populated provinces.  For example, the
reported rates for suicides among women aged 40–44 in the province of Saskatchewan for
the six years between 1970 and 1975 were 12.0, 0.0, 8.4, 0.0, 4.4, and 18.0.  These data
were for a period in which there were 3, 0, 2, 0, 1, and 6 suicides, respectively, for this
age group.
Second, data on suicides are reported by age and sex, not by marital status.   This is
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somewhat problematic for us as the strongest test of our model involves comparing the
impact of this legislative change on married and unmarried women.  Our solution is to
divide our data into four age cohorts:  15–19, 20–24, 25–44, and 45–64.  The proportion
of women who are married in the younger two cohorts around the time of this legislative
change was about 8 percent and 50 percent, respectively.  By contrast, approximately 90
percent of women in the two older cohorts were married.  There is a second reason for
dividing the date by age cohort, one that follows from three interrelated factors:  a
relatively high incidence of suicide throughout Canada during the Great Depression, a
relatively low rate in the postwar period, and the established fact that individuals, and
especially children, who are bereaved by a suicide are themselves much more likely to
commit suicide themselves (Cain 1966; Giffin and Felsenthal 1983).  Suppose we ignored
these factors and presented results based on data for the age group 20–65.  This combined12
age cohort would contain individuals who enter into our sample with significantly less
exposure to suicide at precisely the point in time at which we hypothesize that there
should exist a structural break in the suicide trend for a completely different reason.  To
elaborate, a 25-year-old born in Ontario in 1950 who has relatively little exposure to
suicide in her parents’ generation enters the sample in 1975.  By separating the sample into
four cohorts, we can test whether this factor (an age cohort that is not very familiar with
suicide) is affecting our results.
We deliberately exclude children in the work reported below.  For young people,
other factors, such as difficulties with schooling, broken homes and/or parental divorce,
child abuse, and sexual assault, are held to be much more important with regard to suicide
(Garfinkel and Golombek 1977).  We exclude consideration of individuals over the age of
65 because here, too, the principal cause of suicide lies in factors completely unrelated to
distribution of resources within marriage.  In particular, deterioration of both physical and
mental health are major determinants of suicide in elderly Canadians (Lepine 1982).
The next feature we note is that the period spanned by these data is one that also
witnessed major changes in labor market conditions and, in particular, a significant
increase in the long-run or natural rate of unemployment (Bean, Layard, and Nickell
1986).  Female unemployment in Ontario rose from 4.7 percent in the period from 1966 to
1974 to 8.0 percent in the period 1975–1994, and over the same period, the rate for men
rose from 3.6 to 7.1 percent.  This shift away from near full-employment occurred around
the same time as the hypothesized break in the trend rate, raising the possibility that resultsSijt ’ "
0
ij % $
0
ijt % "
1
ijDUj % $
1
ijDTtj % (j)UNjt % ,ijt,
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 We use the aggregate provincial unemployment rates instead of gender-specific rates. This allows
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us to utilize a longer time series on unemployment. However, for the subsample where we do have separate
data on male and female unemployment rates, there is no evidence of any substantial deviations between the
two series other than in their mean levels.
(1)
for a univariate time-series analysis of suicide rates may be confounded by changes in
labor market conditions.  We therefore examine the evolution of suicide rates in a
multivariate setting where we control for changes in unemployment.
5
Finally, we include a trend variable in the model to capture other changes in all
other variables that might affect suicide rates during this period.  In preliminary work, we
experimented with the inclusion of women's labor market participation rates, levels of real
per capita income, and the ratio of male-female wages.  However, because all three trend
upwards over this period, their effects are captured via the inclusion of a deterministic
trend.  Our hypothesis, therefore, is that there is a significant break in the trend suicide
rate following the change in marriage law and this is written in the following form:
where S is the suicide rate defined as suicides per 100,000 people, )UN is the change in
the unemployment rate, i denotes the age-sex cohort, j the province, and t is time.  The
dummy variables are defined relative to the hypothesized “break-point,” Tb, thus
DU  = 1 if  t > Tb, 0 otherwise,  j14
 Note that our data are consistent with at least two processes.  The data could be the outcome of a
6
random walk or difference-stationary process or, as discussed by Pierre Perron (1989), they could be generated
by a trend-stationary process where the deterministic trend has experienced a break.  Following the method
proposed by Perron (1989) we conclude that the cohort-specific suicide rates are best characterized as
stationary processes around “broken” deterministic trends.  To save space, these statistics are not presented
here, but are available on request.
DT  = t - Tb if  t > Tb, 0 otherwise. j
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Finally, a word of caution is in order.  In addition to the issues noted above, we are
also faced with the problem of drawing inferences from a relatively short time series. With
only 35 observations, the precision of parameter estimates will be relatively low and tests
of the significance and timing of structural breaks will exhibit low power (Favero and
Hendry 1990; Adam 1993).  
4. RESULTS
FEMALE SUICIDES IN ONTARIO BY AGE COHORT
We begin by testing the hypothesis that the revision to the Ontario law of settlement
in light of Murdoch v. Murdoch leads to a change in the trend suicide rate among women
older than 25 (our proxy for married women) and that the magnitude of this change is
greatest for the oldest cohort.  We start with a description of the data and then proceed to
test, within the confines of our simple model, whether there is evidence of a structural
break.H0: "
1
ij ’ $
1
ij ’ 0 .
15
 Note that, in these regressions, the dependent variable is the provincial suicide rate.  An alternative
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basis for the test would be to normalize Ontario and British Columbia rates on those of Quebec.  Doing so
does not alter the results presented here.
(2)
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the age-specific suicide rates in Ontario.  Two
features are immediately apparent.  The first is that the marked decline in female suicide
rates in Ontario for the age cohorts 25–44 and 45–64 from the mid-1970s onwards.  By
contrast, there is no obvious change in the rates for the younger cohorts.  The second
feature, which is borne out by our subsequent analysis, is that the two older age cohorts
follow broadly similar paths.  To the extent that there are cohort effects, these are fully
captured in the mean value and the corresponding shift in the mean of the series.  In other
words, the timing and sign of the structural break—where it exists—is common across
these age cohorts.
Table 1 reports the results of estimating equation (1) for the four age cohorts.   The
7
hypothesis that there is a significant structural break is tested formally by examining the
validity of the restriction in equation (1):Year
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Figure 1—Female suicide rates: Ontario
The prima facie evidence of a change in the trend rate of female suicide in Ontario
following legal reform is borne out in the results presented in Table 1.  First, the 1975
dummy is negative and significant for the two older age cohorts, but is not negative for the
younger cohorts.  Second, the F-tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of no structural
break for women aged 25–44 and 45–64.  Third, note that the magnitude of the change in
trend is highest for the 45–64 age cohort.  After 1975, the trend rate of suicide per
100,000 women in this age cohort falls by –0.539 per year (0.847 – 1.386), twice as 17
Table 1—Determinants of female suicide rates in Ontario, by cohort
Cohort 15–19 20–24 25–44 45–64
Constant 1.131 3.528 4.145 6.398
(2.612) (4.657)* (7.234)** (6.755)**
Trend  0.0145 0.199 0.612 0.847
(1.615) (3.173) (10.062)** (8.432)**
Change in unemployment rate 0.244 –0.183 0.127 –0.168
(0.833) (0.659) (0.891) (0.717)
1975 dummy (DU) 0.851 1.56 –2.792 –2.718
(1.367) (2.032) (4.469)* (2.629)
Trend break (DT) –0.021 –0.383 –0.907 –1.386
(1.490) (5.022)* (12.853)** (11.864)**
R-square 0.38 0.55 0.88 0.87
n 35 35 35 35
Mean suicide rates
1960–1994 2.91 5.19 8.12 11.85
1960–1974 2.24 4.79 8.99 13.39
1975–1994 3.40 5.50 7.46 10.70
F tests on structural break coefficients (Hypothesized structural
 break is 1975)
Intercept (a1 = 0) 1.474 0.69 3.36 0.25
Trend (b1 = 0) 3.83 18.92** 165.20** 140.74**
Joint (a1 = b1 = 0) 2.055  9.81** 83.72** 70.38**
Cox encompassing tests for nonnested models
Null hypothesis: Model 1 encompasses Model 2 –2.582** –1.092 0.391 0.591
Null hypothesis: Model 2 encompasses Model 1 –3.487** –0.764 –17.721** –12.048**
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses.  ** denotes significance at 1 percent; * denotes significance at 5 percent. 
Critical values for regressions are 1 percent, 5.99; 5 percent, 3.40.  In Model 1, the structural break occurs in
1975.  In Model 2, the structural break occurs in 1980.  Cox test has standard normal distribution under the
null hypothesis that Model 1 encompasses Model 2. 18
 These results are available on request.
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fast as the fall in the rate of women 25–44 and three times as fast as the fall in the rate for
women 20–24.
There are two obvious criticisms of the interpretation of these results.  First, an
observer examining Figure 1 might argue that the break occurs before 1975.  Second,
although the 1975 intercept dummy variable is not significantly negative for the youngest
cohort, the trend break is negative and significant.  We address these concerns in turn. 
The short span of the sample data means that standard approaches to determining breaks
in series when the timing of the break-point is unknown, such as those discussed by
Donald Andrews (1993), will tend to have low discriminating power.  However, it is
possible to select informally the most likely break-point by comparing the explanatory
power of the model estimated over all possible break-points within a range, here taken to
be the period 1970 to 1984.  This process confirms that the "most likely" break-point for
suicide rates for women aged 25–44 and 45–64 in Ontario was around 1974 or 1975, but
certainly no earlier.
8
The second puzzle is that although the time-series analysis rejects the null
hypothesis that there is no break in the deterministic trend for the 20–24 cohort, visual
inspection of Figure 1 suggests that a break occurs around 1980.  Whether 1975 or 1980
is the most likely break-point can be tested, using Cox’s (1961) nonnested encompassing
test.  The Cox test is performed under two specifications of the null hypothesis:  (1) that
the model specified with the structural break occurring in 1975 (Model 1) encompasses19
 The Cox test is one of a class of variance-encompassing tests.  Two outcomes are possible.  The first,
9
decisive outcome is that there is one-way encompassing, so that Model 1 encompasses Model 2 and Model
2 does not encompass Model 1.  The second is where neither model encompasses the other, indicating that
neither model is a dominant specification of the data.
the same model specified with the structural break occurring in 1980 (Model 2), and
(2) vice versa.   The results of the Cox tests are presented at the bottom of Table 1.  They
9
provide decisive evidence that the “early-breaking” model variance-dominates the “late-
breaking” one for the 25–44 and 45–64 age cohorts, an outcome that is consistent with
our argument.  For the 20–24 cohort, there is no decisive evidence that either 1975 or
1980 represents a decisive break in the series.  For the 15–19 cohort, neither break-point
encompasses the other.  This reflects the fact that there is no trend at all.  Including a
break simply creates noise and consumes degrees of freedom.
MALE SUICIDE RATES IN ONTARIO BY AGE COHORT
We now examine whether there exists a structural break in the trend suicide rate for
men in Ontario.  The null hypothesis is that there should be no break associated with a
change in the divorce law.  Rejection of this null hypothesis would cast doubt on the claim
made thus far as it would suggest that there was some other factor, common to both men
and women, that led to a fall in suicide rates in the mid-1970s.
Figure 2 provides age-specific male suicide rates for men living in Ontario.  Visual
inspection of the data suggests that, if anything, male suicide rates rise in the immediate
post-1975 period.  However, the data also show a fall after 1978.  With these data we Year
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Figure 2—Male suicide rates: Ontario
estimate equation (1) for our three male age cohorts and test the null hypothesis of no
structural break.  As the F tests reported in the middle of Table 2 indicate, the null
hypothesis is rejected for all three cohorts.  In other words, the data seem to suggest that
the structural break observed in the female suicide rates in the aftermath of the Family
Law Reform Act, 1975 is also observed among men for whom the legal reform should,
according to our model, have had no impact.
However, closer examination of the characteristics of the time series on male suicide
rates suggests a possible explanation for the apparent break in trend.  First, as 21
Table 2—Determinants of male suicide rates in Ontario, by cohort
Cohort 15–19 20–24 25–44 45–64
Constant 1.455 5.935 13.811 31.283
(1.066) (2.578)  (14.512)** (31.395)**
Trend 0.772 1.118 0.678 –0.073
(6.821)** (6.200)** (8.718)** (0.988)
Change in unemployment rate 0.175 –0.139 0.055 0.691
(0.078) (0.287) (0.193)  (2.348)
1980 dummy (DU) 2.861 5.273 3.862 –0.661
(2.068)  (2.306)  (3.004) (2.629)
Trend break (DT) -1.061 –1.939 –0.899 –0.734
(7.716)** (8.363)** (6.705)** (5.226)**
R-square 0.82 0.79 0.74 0.87
n 35 35 35 35
Mean suicide rates
1960–1994 11.66 20.95 21.34 27.09
1960–1974 8.32 16.94 19.53 30.42
1975–1994 14.17 23.95 22.70 24.59
F tests on structural break coefficients (Hypothesized structural
 break is 1975)
Intercept (a1 = 0) 4.09* 0.138 0.44 0.83
Trend (b1 = 0) 0.023 19.53** 59.18** 21.99**
Joint (a1 = b1 = 0) 7.35* 10.68** 32.26** 13.14**
Cox encompassing tests for nonnested models
Null hypothesis: Model 1 encompasses Model 2 –0.615 –1.348 –2.175* –2.014*
Null hypothesis: Model 2 encompasses Model 1 –1.589 –0.532 –1.361 –0.393
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses.  ** denotes significance at 1 percent; * denotes significance at 5 percent. 
Critical values for regressions are: 1 percent, 5.99; 5 percent, 3.40.  In Model 1 the structural break occurs in
1975; in Model 2 the structural break occurs in 1980.  Cox test has standard normal distribution under the
null hypothesis that Model 1 encompasses Model 2. 22
Figure 2 shows, the suicide data for the older male cohort in Ontario indicate unusually
high recorded suicide rates for 1968 and 1971.  (The recorded rates of 36 and 40 per
100,000 men were 2.1 and 2.8 standard deviations, respectively, from the mean of the
1960–1974 period.)  Given the short sample period of data, not only do these outliers
strongly influence the time-series analysis on whether and when there was a break in the
trend, they also suggest significantly differing behavior between the two Ontarian male
cohorts.  If we were to treat these rates as genuine outliers, the results for the two
Ontarian male cohorts would converge.  Second, although the time-series analysis still
rejects the null hypothesis that there is no break in the deterministic trend, it seems that
this break does not occur until much later than the Murdoch v. Murdoch  ruling.  As
discussed above, the short span of the sample data means that standard approaches to
determining breaks in series when the timing of the break-point is unknown lack the power
to reject the null.  Therefore, as with our analysis of the data on female suicides, we
examine the sequence of equation standard errors generated by estimating the model for
the period 1970 to 1984.  This process suggests that 1980 emerges as the most likely
break-point for the male suicide rate in Ontario, in contrast to the 1974/75 break point
observed for women.  Notwithstanding the charge of data mining, we use this procedure
to estimate the best-fitting versions of the model (equation [6]), presented in Table 2. 
These preferred specifications are then used to construct a second Cox (1961) nonnested
encompassing test.  It is performed under two specifications of the null hypothesis: 
(1) that the model specified with the structural break occurring in 1975 (Model 1)23
encompasses the same model specified with the structural break occurring in 1980 (Model
2), and (2) vice versa.  Results are presented at the bottom of Table 2.  They indicate that
the “late-breaking” model variance-dominates the “early-breaking” one for male suicide
rates in Ontario.  Recall that the converse is clearly the case for the female rate in Ontario. 
It could be argued that the presence of this later structural break for males could be
related to changes in divorce laws, with a rather long adjustment lag.  If correct, this
would seriously weaken the argument being advanced in this paper.  It is, however,
difficult to sustain the argument that the same phenomenon—changing the rules of divorce
in favor of women—should induce an immediate positive response for female suicide rates
but should take almost 6 years to induce a change in male suicide rates.  It seems
reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the break in male suicide rates at the end of the
1970s is due to factors other than changes in divorce law following Murdoch v. Murdoch.
FEMALE SUICIDES IN QUEBEC
The evidence presented thus far is broadly supportive of our hypothesis that
changes in laws of settlement improved the well-being of married women in Ontario, as
measured here by the fall in suicide rates of women aged 25–64.  This legislative change
does not seem to have had a strong effect on two groups whom we had hypothesized
would be unaffected by this change:  younger women (who were less likely to be married)
and men.  However, it could be argued that perhaps there was just some other factor that
caused the suicide rates of women aged 25–64 to fall.  We can test this hypothesis by24
 In order to save space, the full results for Quebec are not reported here, but are available on request.
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exploiting a “natural experiment” in our data.  Recall from our introduction that the legal
change did not occur in Quebec. Therefore, unlike Ontario, we expect that there should be
no change in the trend rate of suicide for women 25–44 and 45–64.  Figure 3, which
shows the suicide rates for Quebec women, disaggregated by age, is entirely consistent
with this claim.  There is no obvious change in the trend suicide rate for women in these
age cohorts around 1975. This visual evidence is confirmed by econometric testing,
reported in Table 3, which indicates that the null hypothesis (equation [2]) cannot be
rejected for the older age cohorts in Quebec and is only weakly rejected for the youngest
cohort.
10
SUICIDE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
We began our analysis with data from Ontario because, as suicide is a very rare
event, it was necessary to draw on a large population and Ontario is Canada’s most
populous province.  We also had prima facie reasons for believing that these data were
less prone to reporting errors.  In this section, we extend our analysis to British Columbia,
Canada’s third most populous province.  We do so with some caution.  British Columbia
has a much higher proportion of Aboriginal peoples within its borders.  The recording of
suicides among these communities has proven to be particularly problematic (Health and
Welfare Canada 1989), thus exacerbating problems of measurement error.  Further, Year
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Figure 3—Female suicide rates:  Quebec
Table 3—F tests on structural break coefficients:  Quebec women
                                  Null hypothesis                                
Intercept Trend Joint
Cohort a1 = 0 b1 = 0 a1 = b1 = 0
Female 25–44 0.34 3.85 3.02
Female 45–64 1.98 1.45 0.68
Notes:  ** denotes significance at 1 percent; * denotes significance at 5 percent. 
Hypothesized structural break is 1975.27
aboriginal males have a much higher propensity to commit suicide than white males
(Statistics Canada 1997), reflecting a range of factors such as difficulties associated with
integration into dominant Canadian society and the deterioration of traditional and cultural
values (Health and Welfare Canada 1989).  These factors, together with our short time
series, suggest that it will be more difficult to test for the presence of a structural break. 
These fears are borne out in Figures 4 and 5, which provide age-specific suicide rates for
women and men in British Columbia.  The male series for all age cohorts appears to
exhibit a rather high degree of variation when compared to both the Ontario males and the
female series for all three provinces.  Not surprisingly, with the exception of the female
25–44 and 45–64 age cohorts, the goodness-of-fit of equation (1) estimated for these data
was much lower than that recorded for either adult males or females in Ontario.
Despite this weaker data, an interesting complication makes testing for a structural
break worth pursuing.  Rather than rushing in with stop-gap legislation, as was the case in
Ontario, the British Columbia government established a Royal Commission in December
1973 to examine the whole issue of marital property.  Its report, submitted in March 1975,
“undoubtedly served to stimulate a desire to change the law governing matrimonial
property” (McLeod and Mamo 1995, BC-3).  The report led to the Family Relations Act,
1978.  This legislation was broadly similar to that put into place in Ontario.  Thus,
although the change in legislation was passed in 1978 and came into force in 1979, as
noted above, expectations of change were raised by the establishment of the Royal Year
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Figure 4—Female suicide rates: British Columbia
Figure 5—Male suicide rates: British Columbia29
Commission in 1973.  It is useful to recall the comment made by Dixit and Pindyck in their
discussion of noneconomic applications to their model of investment under uncertainty.
They write: 
Whatever its merits or demerits as descriptive theory, the
Hamermesh-Soss model is not rational enough from the
prescriptive viewpoint, because it forgets the option value of
staying alive.  Suicide is the ultimate irreversible act, and the
future has a lot of ongoing uncertainty.  Therefore the option
value of waiting to see ‘if something will improve’ should be
very large (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, 24).
The establishment of the Royal Commission can be thought of as something that generated
the likelihood that “something will improve.”  This suggests that we would expect to see a
break in the data slightly before actual legislation, as is the case in Ontario.  We therefore
propose that the break in the deterministic trend occurs from 1974 onwards.  Mindful of
our caveats regarding the data, we further hypothesize that no such break should occur for
women aged 20–24 or men.
To save space, we report only the results of our summary test statistics in Tables 4
and 5.  As in the case of Ontario, our F tests decisively reject the null hypothesis of no
structural break in the trend rate of suicide for women aged 25–44 and 45–64.  This result 30
Table 4—F tests on structural break coefficients:  British Columbia women and men
                                  Null hypothesis                                
Intercept Trend Joint
Cohort a1 = 0 b1 = 0 a1 = b1 = 0
Female 20–24 0.01 21.17** 11.55**
Female 25–44 9.55** 66.20** 30.84**
Female 45–64 5.35* 39.68** 19.91**
Male 20–24 2.16 46.89** 30.61**
Male 25–44 0.81 16.44** 8.29**
Male 45–64 0.48 8.47** 4.26*
Notes: ** denotes significance at 1 percent; * denotes significance at 5 percent. 
Hypothesized structural break is 1974.
Table 5—Cox encompassing tests for nonnested models:  British Columbia women
and men
Null hypothesis: Null hypothesis:
Cohort Model 1 encompasses Model 2 Model 2 encompasses Model 1
Women 20–24 –1.765 –4.455**
Women 25–44 1.877 –10.137**
Women 45–64 1.655 –8.886**
Men 20–24 –1.303 –3.433**
Men 25–44 –2.363* –3.390**
Men 45–64 –2.603* –1.836
Notes: ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; * indicates significance at the 5
percent level.  Cox test has standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis
that Model 1 encompasses Model 2.  Model 1: structural break occurs in 1975;
Model 2: structural break occurs in 1980.31
is consistent with our basic argument.  But again like the results from Ontario, we also
find evidence of structural breaks for individuals who we hypothesize are unaffected by
these changes:  younger women and men.  As before, we infer the most likely break-point
in the male data by examining the sequence of equation standard errors generated by
estimating the model for the period 1970 to 1984.  And a Cox test is performed under two
specifications of the null hypothesis:  (1) that the model specified with  the structural break
occurring in 1974 (Model 1) encompasses the same model specified with the structural
break occurring in 1980 (Model 2), and (2) vice versa.  The results provide mixed support
for our hypothesis.  On the one hand, the “early-breaking” model variance-dominates the
“late-breaking” one for female suicide rates for age cohorts 25–44 and 45–64, lending
further support to the Dixit and Pindyck inspired view that the announcement of an
inquiry into divorce law reform in British Columbia best predicts the change in behavior. 
The results also lend support to the “late-breaking” model for the oldest male cohort. 
However, contrary to expectations, the early breaking model variance-dominates in the
youngest cohorts for either sex and the results for men 25–44 are indeterminate.
5.  CONCLUSION
The motivation for this paper lies in the difficulties faced by economists in devising
discriminating empirical tests that distinguish unitary from collective models of the
household.  In this paper, we exploit a dramatic change in divorce law in Canada to test
one variant of the collective approach, cooperative Nash-bargained household models. 32
We derive three specific tests: (1) the change in divorce law should only reduce suicides
among married women; (2) it should have a larger effect on the suicide rates of married,
older women; and (3) its impact is asymmetric.  It should not affect the suicide rates of
adult men.  Using data from Ontario, the results of all three tests conform to our
hypotheses.  Further, we extend the tests to two other provinces.  In Quebec, where no
such legislative change took place, no structural break in the data is observed.  The results
for British Columbia also lend some support to the idea advanced by Dixit and Pindyck
that the possibility that “something will improve” will reduce suicide.  It is possible that
the less conclusive results that we obtain for British Columbia may be a consequence of
greater measurement error in the recording of suicides and the presence of a much larger
Aboriginal population.  Accordingly, we conclude that our results favor a variant of the
collective approach over the unitary model.34
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